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ABSTRACT
Since World War II, the Navy Department Organization has under-
gone several important changes reflecting the changing pattern of com-
bat forces and the growing concern of the Nation about the threat of a
Soviet Union blitz war employing hydrogen bombs. This study reports
an inquiry into the existing Navy Department Organization, particularly
in the area of material, and makes recommendations for changes therein.
In this study, an attempt was made to examine the Navy Depart-
ment Organization in its entirety, for the purpose of developing a
new concept of organization. Emphasis has been placed on proposing
novel arrangements of functions rather than on seeking feasible arrange-
ments.
In the collection of data, emphasis was placed upon using the
investigator's background as a naval engineering duty officer and
upon examination of selected literature concerned with organization
and Navy business operations. Discussions were held with Navy execu-
tives as a check upon the problems stated in the literature. From the
viewpoints and facts collected, inferences and conclusions as to Navy
Organization were drawn. After these were subjected to criticism and
test, final conclusions and recommendations were made.
The study concludes that activities at the technical bureau
level can be divided into two major groups: broad decision making and
directing operations. Attention is invited to the "floating base" con-
cept, which divides the functions performed by a ship into two major
parts: providing long-term housing and transport for military per-
sonnel, and providing the base for command and for supply of weapons
during battle. A final conclusion is made that strong centralization
of control of the Navy material functions should be effected.

iii
Major recommendations include establishment of the Under
Secretary of the Navy as "general manager" over the Chief of Naval
Operations, establishment of a new Assistant Secretary for Operations,
reassignment of all bureaus having personnel functions to the Assist-
ant Secretary for Personnel and Reserve Forces, establishment of a
single Assistant Secretary for Material, and establishment of a Service
of Naval Material formed by merger of all material bureaus.
Thesis Supervisor: Samuel E. Eastman





"Nor do I hold with those who regard it as presumption if a man
of low and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the concerns of
princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes place themselves
below in the plain to contemplate the nature of the mountains and of
lofty places, and in order to comtemplate the plains place themselves
high upon the mountains, even so to understand the nature of the people
it needs to be a prince, and to understand that of princes it needs to
be of the people."
Nicolo Machiavelli
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CHAPTER I
PREPARING TO GET UNDERWAY
In world history, the Twentieth Century may very well be nick-
named the "Century of Change." Since World War II, the United States
military organization has contributed several important changes to the
historical grab bag of the Century. In 19^7, a new Department of
Defense was created. Subsequently, the Department of Defense has
undergone three major changes. After each of these changes, the Navy
Department organization has been altered in a process of accomodation.
These changes in military organization reflect the changing pattern of
combat forces and the growing concern of the Nation about the threat
of a Soviet Union blitz war employing hydrogen bombs.
The Honorable Thomas S. Gates, Secretary of the Navy, has empha-
sized the necessity for continued change as follows: "the Navy must
also develop and use new concepts of management and executive develop-
ment to ensure efficiency and the best use of people." 1 Professor
Leo B. Moore of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology stressed the
significant emergence of change by stating that "improvement has become
one of the most important processes of management — on a par with the
traditionally recognized processes of planning, organizing, operating,
and controlling."
1
"Naval Leadership," U.S. Navy Department General Order No. 21
of March 17, 1958.
Leo B. Moore, "How to Manage Improvement," Harvard Business
Review, 56:75, July-August, 1958.

2In August 1958» the 85th Congress passed the Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. Certain provisions of this Act
called for changes in the Navy Department which became effective in
February, 1959. As a consequence, the Navy Department is in the process
of taking a new look at its organization. A committee with Under
Secretary Franke as chairman recently reported its findings and recom-
mendations to the Secretary of the Navy.* In keeping with the spirit
of the times and with the current interest of the Navy Department in
reorganization, this study reports an inquiry into the existing Navy
Department Organization and makes recommendations for changes therein.
Statement of the problem . It was the purpose of this study:
(1) to analyze organizational features of the Navy Department
at the Technical Bureau level.
(2) to examine the conclusions, recommendations, and obser-
vations of various committees studying governmental
organization for pertinent viewpoints having applica-
tion to an improved Navy Department Organization.
(5) in the light of the above analysis and examination, to
recommend changes in the Navy Department Organization
for effecting a better Technical Organization at the
Bureau level.
Justification of the study . There has been recently an
invigorating rebirth in the study of organization of large businesses.
Managers are approaching the study of a company from the point of
view of the whole and are attempting to avoid the pit-falls of
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sub-optimization,, All of the studies of Naval Organization examined by
this investigator have been concerned more with increasing the effi-
ciency of functional parts, rather than looking at the Navy Department
as a whole „ The Hoover Commissions of 19^9 and 1955 seemed to concen-
trate on the study of functional parts. In this study, an attempt was
made to examine the Navy Department Organization from the point of view
of the whole, for the purpose of developing a new concept of organiza-
tion. Emphasis has been placed on proposing novel arrangements of
functions, rather than on seeking feasible compromises.
Limitations of the study . For the purposes of this study, the
Technical Organization at the Bureau level of the Navy Department (here-
after referred to as the Navy Technical Organization) is defined to be
those activities, offices, and individuals of the Navy Department
charged with the research, development, procurement, production, and
distribution of material and facilities in support of the Operating
Forces .5 The Navy Technical Organization as defined does not exist
today as a specific entity in the Navy Department. For the purposes
of this study, it serves, however, as a useful conceptual building
block, and further, it emerges as a proposed entity in the recommenda-
tion for a Service of Naval Material. The limiting phrase "at the
^William B. Franke, Chairman, et„ al . Report of the Committee
on Organization of the Department of the Navy 1959 (Franke Report)
^Washington: Department of the Navy, 1959*5""
Peter F. Drucker, The Practice of Management (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 195^), PP° 19*5^57"
^Report of the Committee on Organization of the Department of
the Navy" ( Gate s Report) 16 April 195^ (Washington Government Printing
Office, 195^0, PPo 5-15.

Bureau level" serves to alert the reader that this study is primarily
concerned with organizational relationships of the Navy Department at
Washington, D„ C» These organizational relationships include those
between the various Assistant Secretaries, the Chief of Naval Operations,
the various Technical Bureaus, and the various Offices, Existing
organizations are broadly divided as follows:
Outside the technical
organization
Chief of Naval Operations
Commandant of the Marine
Corps
Bureau of Naval Personnel
Bureau of Medicine and
Surgery
Office of Industrial Rela-
tions




Office of Analysis and
Review
The naval activities, under the management control of the bureaus and
offices, and the industrial contractors are the building blocks which
the Navy Technical Organization is directing in its mission of provid-
ing material and facilities in support of the Operating Forces.
Within the technical
organization
Under and Assistant Secretaries
of the Navy
Office of Naval Material




Bureau of Supplies and Accounts
Bureau of Yards and Docks

5The research method employed . The study proceeded in the
following phases:
Phase 1 — the collection of data.
For providing direct data, the investigator has had various
duties in the Navy Technical Organization as an Engineering Duty
Officer since 1950 « Assignments have included a two-year tour at a
guided missile liaison office, the Bureau of Ordnance Technical
Liaison Office, Southern California Area; two years as the SIDEWINDER
guided missile project coordinator at the Naval Ordnance Test Station,
California; and four years as a technical administrator in the Research
Division, Bureau of Ordnance, Washington, D. C.
To supplement this personal experience, data was collected in
two ways: reading of selected literature concerned with organization
and Navy business operations, and discussions with Navy executives.
The reading was selected to give a broad overview of Navy
administrative history since the American Revolution and then to con-
centrate upon writings concerned with military organization during
World War II and later. In particular, the establishment of the
Department of Defense and three subsequent modifications were studied.
Parallel with this, many of the reports of the Hoover Commissions of
19^9 and 1955 were studied. Other reports studied included the
Rockefeller Report of 1955 and the Gates Report of 195^. The Libby
report and the McManes report, unpublished internal Navy studies, were
also reviewed. Various reports of the Industrial College of the Armed
Forces furnished additional information. The Franke Report of 1959

6was available for review about one week before this study was completed,
The discussions were conducted to provide additional background
information and to insure that the problems mentioned in the literature
included all of the major problems affecting today's Navy executives,,
Meetings were held with two Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, three
technical bureau chiefs, two other flag officers, and several junior
executives. Each of the executives was furnished a list of four ques-
tions, included as Appendix A, about two weeks in advance of the inter-
view. The questions were used to acquaint the executive with the kind
of information that the investigator was seeking. No attempt was made
to force answers to the specific questions, and in some cases, none of
the questions were discussed. The sum total of the personal interviews
reinforced the material gathered in the investigator's personal experi-
ence and in the study of the literature.
Phase 2 — the classification and arrangement of facts.
As the study of the literature was completed and the discus-
sions were concluded, notes were made of what appeared to be signifi-
cant viewpoints. About the end of phase 1, various charts and tables
were made to illustrate relationships such as the flow of money and
material, the flow of information, steps in a project sequence, deci-
sion levels, analysis of coordinate relationships, and analysis of
activities. Figures 1 through 5 of Chapter III illustrate the type of
chart constructed.
Phase 5 — "the making of inferences and drawing of conclusions.
Based on the analysis of the data and facts, various tentative

7Navy Department Organizations were synthesized, conclusions were estab-
lished, and recommendations for changes were proposed.
Phase A — the subjecting of inferences and conclusions
to criticism and test.
As the weeks elapsed during this study, consideration of all
the viewpoints and analyses caused a continual changing of the conclu-
sions and recommendations. Comments by various instructors of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology also initiated chain-reaction
changes which fed back into restudy of the inferences and conclusions,
caused abandonment of some material, and making of new proposals.
Phase 5 — "the establishing of final conclusions.
Precipitated by the catalyst of a deadline date, and born from
the amorphous collection of viewpoints, analyses, proposals, and criti-
cisms, the conclusions and recommendations of this report have emerged,
Major Conclusions and Recommendations . The investigator has come to
certain conclusions, as follows:
(1) The objectives of the Navy Department must be established
to meet the requirements of three groupings of people: the enemy as a
consumer, the American people as a whole setting the working frame-
work, and the individual as an articulate source of power and labor.
(2) The additional subsidiary objectives of the Navy Technical
Organization are to provide maximum readiness of support to the
Operating Forces, orderly innovation of new material, and maximum
cost efficiency in executing the annual expenditures.

8(5) The activities presently conducted at the bureau level can
be divided into two major groups: broad decision making, and direct-
ing operations.
(4) The unique feature of the Navy is its floating bases, which
serve the dual function of providing long-term housing and transport
prior to engagement with the enemy and then of providing the source of
command and weapons during the engagement with the enemy.
(5) Strong centralization of control of Navy material functions
should be effected.
To enable the Navy Department to meet its objectives in an
improved fashion, this investigator recommends the following major
actions
:
(1) The Under Secretary of the Navy should be established as
the General Manager of the Navy Department directly under the Secre-
tary of the Navy.
(2) The assignment of an Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Personnel and Reserve Forces should be continued, and he should be
assigned the over-all responsibility for supervising and coordinating
the Bureaus of Naval Personnel and Medicine and Surgery, and the
Offices of Industrial Relations and Judge Advocate General.
(5) A new Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Operations should
be authorized and designated. He should report to the Under Secretary
of the Navy and should be charged with collaborating with the Chief of
Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps on provision
of Operating Forces for the prosecution of war.

9(h) An Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Material should be
authorized and designated. He should be assigned over-all responsi-
bility for supervising and coordinating the Service of Naval Material.
(5) There should be no other Assistant Secretaries.
(6) A Service of Naval Material should be established to be
headed by a Vice Admiral. This Service should absorb the functions
previously executed by the Offices of Naval Research, Naval Material,
and Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserve; and the Bureaus of Aero-
nautics, Ships, Ordnance, Supplies and Accounts, and Yards and Docks.
(7) The Washington, D*, C. Office of the Service of Naval Material
should be concerned with broad decision making. The remaining activi-
ties concerned with directing operations should be relocated outside
of the Washington area.
(8) The remaining activities of the Service of Naval Material
concerned with directing operations should remain organized broadly as
at present within the Bureaus of Supplies and Accounts, and Yards and
Docks, and the Office of Naval Research; but in the Bureaus of Ships,
Aeronautics, and Ordnance, radical changes should be made. These latter
three Bureaus should be reconstituted into two new Bureaus: Ships and
Weapons. The new Bureau of Ships should provide the floating bases
for the Operating Forces. The new Bureau of Weapons should provide
all of the elements of the weapons systems needed for control in
battle and for delivery of the destructive force to the enemy. The
Bureau of Weapons should include the functions of the existing Bureau
of Ordnance and the existing Bureau of Aeronautics, plus the radar,
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sonar, radio, and combat information center responsibilities of the
existing Bureau of Ships
,
Organization of this report . The detailed material of this
report is presented in the three subsequent chapters. In the first of
these chapters, the investigator identifies three objectives of the
Navy Department and three subsidiary objectives of the Navy Technical
Organization which appear to be major aims for which the Navy strives.
These objectives play dominant roles in shaping the proposals for
changes in organization included in this report. In the second chap-
ter, the pie of the Navy Department Organization is sliced in three
different ways, in order to gain understanding and a framework for
proposed changes. Thus, examination is made of decisions, relation-
ships, and activities concerned with the meeting of Navy objectives.
Finally in the third chapter, description is made of the conclusions
and recommendations reached in this study and of the underlying
reasoning supporting them. A final chapter presents the conclusions




When one considers the Navy Department Organization as a whole,
a most logical starting point is to state the aims of the Department.
With what responsibilities is the Navy Department charged? What are
the objectives which the more than a million Americans employed by the
Navy are trying to achieve? Surely from these objectives must stem
important forces shaping the Navy Organization. This investigator
believes that one of the most heartening aspects of the complex Navy
Organization is the agreement on desired objectives of the Navy,
I OBJECTIVES OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT
The objectives of the Navy Department must be established to
meet the requirements of three groupings of people: (1) the enemy as
the consumer, (2) the American people as a whole setting the frame-
work, and (5) the individual as an articulate source of power and
labor. Although in wartime because of the impelling need for
security American groupings may subvert occasionally their require-
ments, any stable long-time organization must consider the needs of
all three. As suggested by Mahan, the one may be greater and the
others the lesser j nevertheless, all combine to form important
indispensable portions of the whole.
*A„ T. Mahan, Naval Administration and Warfare , (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company, 1908), p„ 9°
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Provision of forces for war . It becomes almost trite to state
that the Navy Department must provide the Naval Operating Forces for
the prosecution of war„ Because this objective is so obvious, its
unique wartime requirements may often be overlooked in the doldrums of
peace
. The objective of providing and maintaining a navy in order to
provide for the common defense stems directly from the provisions of
the Constitution, The requirements of the Operating Forces stem ulti-
mately from the capabilities of the expected enemy The DEW line and
interception missile are demanded by the Soviet long-range bomber
„
The effective sonar equipment and the SUBROC missile are needed because
of the threat of enemy submarines operating close to American shores.
The consequences of this objective are many and varied. Some
naval officers demonstrate such slavish devotion towfd meeting this
objective that they tend to minimize or overlook concurrent require-
ments of the nation as a whole, and of each employee for himself.
For instance, some naval officers find it difficult to reorient
their procedures when performing duty at a business-oriented naval
activity ashore after a military command at sea. The employment of
naval forces in war is the antithesis of democracy. Coordinated obedi-
ence becomes essential in combat, rather than an unfettered cooperation,
Yet, a significantly different climate of mangement should
exist in the Navy Technical Organization. In war, men and material
Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Compo-
nents" Department of Defense Directive No. 5100.1 of 51 December 1958,
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may be destroyed by enemy action,, At any time, equipment may be
rendered obsolete by new enemy technical achievements. One's own
scientific discoveries may supersede existing material. * Just when
obsolescence will occur is often unpredictable. The areas to be
damaged by the enemy and the technical advances which he may achieve
are not readily definable in advance, but the organization must be
able to compensate for their occurence.
The environment of war may extend from the ice-floes of the
Arctic to the tropical jungles of the Equator. The extent of opera-
tions may vary from an all-out blitz to a temporary landing in
Lebanon. The Navy Department must meld human failings, modification
of political principles, uncontrolled losses, a world battleground,
and a variety of possible engagements with ingredients of men, mach-
ines, and facilities to produce effective Naval Operating Forces.
Conformance with national customs , mores , and laws . The cus-
toms, mores, and laws of the democratic United States have placed
complex procedures and irritating hindrances upon the naval admini-
strators, both civilian and military. Civilian control, civil service,
and congressional investigations form essential ingredients of the
Navy's potpourri. These ingredients will require a senior Navy Admiral
to answer patiently elementary questions for the education of a fresh-
man Congressman.^ Congressional desires for advertised-bid contracts,
?Elting Eo Morison, Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19^2), p.6l.
^Ernest J. King and Walter M. Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King A
Naval Record (New York: W.W Norton and Co., 1952), p. 2^9
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a labor union's decision to strike, and a President's desire to balance
the budget will place important bounds upon the sphere of allowable
operation of the Navy Department.
The naval administrator must understand these complex relation-
ships and lead his organization to perform in harmony with the multiple
objectives of the American people,, In the stress of wartime, the
American people will effect changes which give the Navy Department
ample freedom,.
Meeting needs of the individual employee . The civil servant
and the military man require. career patterns that motivate them to
sustained effort during the long duration of the cold war. Career
patterns may be de-emphasized during wartime, but even then, recogni-
tion of an individual's efforts is a necessity,, As illustrations of
the belief in importance of the individual, two examples are cited.
William R. Kintner, in writing a provocative book about the Defense
Department, considers that "perhaps the most vital element in a defense
organization is the manpower within it M ^ The foreword in the book
Naval Leadership stresses that "no matter what the weapons of the
future may be, no matter how they are to be employed in war or inter-
national diplomacy, man will still be the most important factor in
naval operations „" If adequate career patterns are not in effect,
^William R„ Kintner, Forging a New Sword A Study of the Depart-
ment of Defense (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1958), p. 21.
Malcolm E„ Wolfe, Frank J„ Mulholland, John M. Laudenslager, et
al
,




enlisted men fail to reenlist, civil service workers quit, and naval
officers resign. The pay raises of 195& &nd emphasis on education and
training at government expense reflect the continuing interest of
government administrators in this area.
II SUBSIDIARY OBJECTIVES OF THE NAVY TECHNICAL ORGANIZATION
In addition to supporting the objectives of the Navy Department
Organization, the Navy Technical Organization is concerned with the
following subsidiary objectives.
Providing maximum readiness In its Operating Forces and sup-
porting industrial complex, the navy must be at maximum readiness at
all times. • The navy has not forgotten the painful sting of Pearl
Harbor. The intercontinental bomber and the intercontinental ballistic
missile armed with nuclear warheads have brought the threat of crushing
enemy action against the United States homeland within a few hours or
perhaps minutes of an opening of hostilities. This objective poses
the continual problem of balancing when the Department should be satis-
fied with the present state of the art and go into production against
when research and development engineers should be permitted additional
time to improve the proposed design in order to make it more suitable
for the Operating Forces „ Limitations on the availability of national
resources usually prevent all alternatives being supported.
Achieving orderly innovations . Kintner establishes that one of
the Department of Defense measures of performance must be that it
'Kintner, op_. cit
. , p„ 15«
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"assure maximum development and application, with minimum duplication
8
and waste, of available scientific resources." This is equally valid
as a Navy objective „ It is in this area perhaps that the most search-
ing congressional examinations will take place* In an era of rapid
technological change, scientific breakthroughs must be speedily trans-
formed into available combat weapons.
Producing maximum cost efficiency . A military technical organi-
zation has the additional responsibility "to achieve maximum cost
efficiency and to gain the optimum defense capabilities from the dol-
lar expenditures available.
"f Common sense demands that the Navy
provide maximum security for the resources which have been allocated.
Ill SUMMARY
The desired objectives of the Navy Department provide dominant
forces in shaping the Navy Organization. In considering objectives of
the Navy Department as a whole, it becomes convenient to focus on three
major objectives: (1) provision of forces for war, (2) conformance
with national customs, mores, and laws, and (5) meeting needs of the
individual employee. Within the Navy Technical Organization, which is
concerned with the provision of material and facilities in support of
the Operating Forces, three subsidiary objectives are identifiable.
These are (1) providing maximum readiness, (2) achieving orderly inno-
vations, and (5) producing maximum cost efficiency.
The objectives examined in this chapter serve as the backdrop
for the stage to be examined in the next chapter.
8Kintner, op_„ cit




The objectives developed in Chapter II represent the needs which
the Navy Organization must be designed to fulfill. Although this inves-
tigator has chosen to emphasize technical aspects of the organization,
consideration must be given to all objectives of the Navy Department
and their inner relationships. In this Chapter, a look is taken in
three ways at Navy Organization aspects. In making such an overlap-
ping analysis, one obtains a better grasp of the fundamental workings
of the Navy Department.
I ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS
Capturing the true decision-making process of the Navy Depart-
ment is difficult because of the many forces which may come to bear on
any decision. Kintner has captured the problem of the military depart-
ment as he states:
The Defense Department organizational structure and proce-
dures must be such as to foster a decision-making process,
including a cycle of research and development, which assures
the timely introduction of the most scientific advances into
modern armed forces and their weaponry, but in a planned,
smooth transition which avoids disrupting the effectiveness
and readiness of forces already maintained. . . o o o
Ipeter F. Drucker, The Practice of Management (New York: Harper
and Brothers Publishers, 195?), PP» 195-2.2%] James C. Charlesworth,
Governmental Admini stration (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers,
1951), PPo 217-258.
William R. Kintner, Forging a New Sword (New York: Harper and
Brothers Publishers, 1958), p. 19°
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In a military department, the most important source of impinge-
ment upon the decision-making process, particularly in time of war,
is the friendly-enemy complex,, In Figure 1, the factors which provide
the backdrop for this impingement are illustrated. One's own Operating
Forces after a declaration of war deliver war goods to the enemy during
battles and engagements,, Through intelligence, the military market
research, information is fed back to the Operating Forces. This may
be used in changing a combat tactic or in the case of an enemy innova-
tion, the intelligence information is fed back to the Navy Department
to impinge upon the decision-making process of the Technical Organiza-
tion. Also illustrated are many factors which are impinging upon the
Operating Forces in addition to intelligence. Important among these
is the new material being generated by research and development from
the Navy Shore Establishment. It should be noted that the enemy is
both a customer and a competitor. He is not only consuming the Navy's
goods, but he is also attempting to deliver his own goods to the
Operating Forces. The Operating Forces send back to the Navy Depart-
ment requirements for materials to keep the fleet operating, requests
for replacements for damaged or destroyed vessels, and requirements
for technological improvements to compete with the forces of the enemy
and nature. The local Washington representative of the Operating
Forces is the Chief of Naval Operations. Another important impinge-
ment on the process and in many ways a part of the process is the
contribution by the private contractors and the naval activities.





























Note: This complex has a mirror image in which the
enemy is carrying out a similar process on
the Operating Forces.
Figure lo The friendly-enemy complex which impinges on the
Navy Department decision-making process,,
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output of actual hardware. Superimposed above them is the navy bureau
and department hierarchy which conducts a decision making process during
the making of the budget and technical program review. The budget and
the technical program are inextricably interlaced. To conduct a tech-
nical program, one needs money from the budget. To obtain money, one
must have the justification of a needed technical program.
The doer agencies provide technical proposals and dollar require-
ments to the bureaus. Since they are the source of information closest
to the actual hardware, they play their most important part in the
decision-making process by controlling what information is passed to
the bureau and department for review. A chemistry student in high
school sometimes adjusts the results from his experiments to meet the
known facts required for the workbook. The doer agencies sometimes
provide only the facts necessary for a supported point of view. The
sin may be one of omission rather than one of falsification of facts.
This same difficulty is present throughout the organization as any
holder of information may act as a distorting transmitter. It should
be noted that the withholding of vital information may be inadvertant
rather than deliberate. In some cases, only a delaying action is
necessary to affect the course of decision making.
The flood of information into the bureaus ebbs and flows with
the budget year. As the technical bureaus commence budget preparation
early in the calendar year, the major decision-making process of the
bureaus begins. Financial requirements and technical proposals are
received from industry and government activities. Project officers
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and engineers scurry to place their projects in rounded shape as the
decision making process is about to begin. They again participate in
the process as they delete or add specific technical proposals in their
area of responsibility,, The project officer (who may be either a civil-
ian or a military person) is the focal point in the bureau where
"directing operations" lets off and "broad decision making" commences.
As illustrated in Figure 2, the project officer and his subordinates
direct operations by initiating the task authorizations and contracts
to the doer activities. They initiate the decision-making process by
gathering together a synthesis of the technical proposals and the
financial requirements in the form of budget requests. These budget
requests then go to higher review levels, where the proposals of sev-
eral project officers are consolidated. At this point, the review
level may approve unchanged, delete completely, or adjust up or down
the budget requests. Review levels are particularly concerned with
balancing program emphasis or placing adequate support in projects
where critical dates are involved which interlock with other important
projects. Decisions are made on the basis of beliefs as to the rela-
tive priorities of programs influenced by official letters, personal
telephone calls, Sputniks in the air, technical promise, past history
of higher reviews, and individual convictions.
On the surface, the decision-making process appears deceptively
simple. But as the pruning of requests occurs on the budget tree,
cross-coordinating aspects of the changes become important. Will

















Introduces changes from higher
review
Supplies liaison





agency costs [ Hardwar
level
Figure 2„ Activities at the Bureau level and at the "Doer" agency level
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presently active stations and contractors? What are the consequences
of a major contractor, such as Chance-Vought, losing major contracts,
such as the REGULUS II guided missile and the F8U fighter? If the
requested facilities are disapproved, where will the long-range missile
be tested, or how will the giant rocket motors be manufactured in
quantity? If support is not given to the powder factory in Maryland
or the ammunition depot in Massachusetts, what will be the local pub-
lic reaction and that of the corresponding Congressional representa-
tives? If the 100 POLARIS rocket motors are to be manufactured in the
only available facilities, where will the 5000 REGULUS I rocket motors
be built? Can two surface-to-surface missile programs be afforded, or
should all effort be placed on one of the missiles? Are enough critical
materials available? These examples illustrate the varieties of deci-
sions. Nevertheless, they are being and will be made. The frustrations
occur as the various administrative levels begin to disagree violently
as to which projects should be supported and at what financial levels.
As the project officer has his higher review levels within a
bureau, so the bureaus have their higher review levels acting in the
Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy, and their associ-
ated offices. The Navy Department, in turn, must face review by the
Defense Department, the Bureau of the Budget, the President, and the
Congress. The Secretary of the Navy ultimately must consolidate the
individual bureau budgets into a single Navy budget. At this level,
broader considerations - political, strategic, and economic - force
decisions as to inclusion or omission of entire projects or groups of
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projects,, In some cases, only financial levels will be altered. In
the making of these decisions, consideration must be given to the hurt
feelings of the behemoths, the technical bureaus. As loyal, strongly-
motivated social groupings, the people of a bureau feel a strong sense
of disappointment as their splendid TRITON missile program is cancelled
in favor of the not-invented-here REGULUS II missile of a sister bureau.
The sense of loss is similar to that felt by the students of a uni-
versity when their team comes out on the short end of the score.
II ANALYSIS OF RELATIONSHIPS
The navy press gang has given way to selective service. The
mail-carrying sloop has given way to world-wide radio communication.
The war supply from a "have" nation of raw materials has given way to
severe restrictions and control of critical materials. Changing rela-
tionships such as these require adaptive changes in the Navy Organiza-
tion. Relationships have an amorphous character, much like the morals
of a nation, which makes specific description difficult. These rela-
tionships nevertheless exist and they place important bounds on a
naval administrator's conduct and upon his organization. Figure 5
illustrates three important relationships: political, economic, and
individual. Urwick, in describing management as a basic intellectual
discipline calls these relationships: political science, economics,
and psychology. * The Naval Organization must accomodate these and learn
to live with them.













Figure 5- Political, economic, and individual relationships
which impinge on the Navy Department and the Navy Technical Organization,
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Political o Political relationships may be exemplified by the
following three areas: presidential, congressional, and military per-
sonnel groups
o
The President has a complex job with a maximum tenure of eight
years. He is the leader of his political party, the chief of the armed
forces, the leader of the executive branch of the government, and the
leader of the nation in the eyes of the people of the world, both at
home and abroad. Richard E. Neudstadt, a former White House advisor,
succinctly captures the President's dilemma with respect to the mili-
tary budget as follows:
...That budget represents more than half the dollars of
federal outlay year by year, four-fifths of the persons
on all federal payrolls, half the Government's civilian
personnel. It represents a mainstay of deterrence and
recourse in the cold war, a bed-rock stabilizer in the
national economy. Its annual determination raises issues
of strategy, of economics, politics, administration, and
(emphatically) technology; none of which are really man-
ageable in annual or financial terms ... ; none of which
are really soluble by reference to anybody's certain
knowledge, for nothing is certain save uncertainty in
these spheres. To estimate what the American economy can
"stand" is not to answer what Congress and interest groups
will "take" (or what would be required to equate the two).
To estimate what new weapons may do is not to answer what
may be demanded of them, or opposed to them, years hence.
To estimate the Russians' capabilities is not to answer
what are their intentions .**
Congress provides both the funds and a puzzling relationship for
the naval administrator. Congress provides the national equivalent
^Richard E. Neudstadt, "The Presidency at Mid-Century," Law and
Contemporary Problems , Duke University School of Law, Autumn, 195^»
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of the town-meeting where all aspects of any questions can be aired
and considered. Congressmen find themselves under pressure from many
groups: constituents, radicals, lobbies, parties, and the administra-
tion. As a sounding board for the Nation, and perhaps even as a sub-
stitute for the price mechanism of the private enterprise world, their
inquiries lead them into the minutest parts of the Navy Organization.
Perhaps their most significant relationship is the continuity which
members of various committess provide. Their tenures as legislators
far exceed the terms of the President, the tenure of a Department Head,
and the flag-rank service of senior naval officers. For example, the
vital experience of Senator Russell of Georgia, Chairman of the Armed
Services Committee, goes back far beyond the beginning of World War II.
Representative Vinson of Georgia proposed plans for reorganization of
the Navy back in the early 50 's„
Of all the political groupings acting on the Navy Organization,
the military personnel groups may act the most unobtrusively, yet with
the greatest influence. These groups often result from identification
to a common skill. In one decade, the dominant group may be the "Gun
Club." In the next, the battleship admirals. Today, the submariners,
the aviators, and the engineering duty officers form effective groups
which oppose and support various viewpoints within the Navy Organiza-
tion. As an entire group, the military personnel may strive on occa-
sion with the civil servants and the political leaders. This
^William S. White, Citadel The Story of the U.S. Senate (New
York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1956), PP<> 156-9»
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investigator is not trying to condemn nor praise this political activity.
The sophisticated naval executive must learn to expect and to accomo-
date such politics
o
Figure 5 illustrates additional political groups which impinge
on the naval executive „ In the United States democratic government,
such groupings will always provide important forces affecting the Navy
Department.
Economic . The demands of the Navy have a direct impact upon
the economy of the nation,, Deciding upon an annual budget level for
the armed forces is much the, same as an individual deciding upon the
total annual amount of life insurance premiums he will pay. The more
money spent annually, the greater the payoff will be should war or
death occur., But also, the more money spent on insurance today, the
less is available for other needs
In wartime, the pressure upon civilian needs increases. Manu-
facture of automobiles is converted to manufacture of tanks. Food and
automobile tires are rationed. Critical materials must be allocated
between pressing military and urgent civilian requirements. This situa-
tion has been aggravated by the change of the United States to a "have-
not" nation in many important raw materials. As illustrated in Figure
5, Congress acts as the nation's spokesman in the allocation of
resources.
Individual . Human relations is an ever-present aspect of the
Navy Organization. Within the Navy Department, individual relationships
become even more important since the Department is concerned with
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processing information,, The most advanced computer developed to date
has not approached the capability of the human mind for processing non-
numerical information,, Furthermore, the presence of many intangible
factors which enter into the decision making process ultimately results
in the need for making a considered judgement, rather than a precise
mathematical selection. For the foreseeable future, judgement making
will involve individuals,,
It is also appropriate to reiterate that the Navy must enable
the individual to meet his own needs „ The slave labor of the Russian
state is not available here,, Even the enlisted man, or the officer,
although serving for various obligated tenures, must be satisfying
basic needs or sand in the form of reluctant submission or open hos-
tility pours into the gears of Naval organization,, Figure 5 illustrates
the complex of individual relationships which are closely interlocked,
III ANALYSIS OF ACTIVITY
Urwick in a recent informal discussion identified two distinct
activities which must be performed in management, the art of getting
things done through people. First, determination must be made of what
needs to be done. This may be called policy making or, as in Figure 2,
broad-decision making. Second, what needs to be done must be accom-
plished. This may be called executive action or, as in Figure 2,
directing operations.
General . The keystone of the bureau arch is the project officer,
who is the individual in the bureau responsible for the technical and
fiscal coordination of a specific project. Each bureau is organized
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so that official correspondense concerning a project is sent to a pro-
ject officer for coordination., Where a project extends into several
major divisions of a bureau, the project officer providing overall
coordination is often found in the Research and Development Division.
Much depends upon the individual initiative of the officers and engin-
eers to foresee coordination problems and achieve prompt corrections.
Except for minor amounts of display hardware, the project officer deals
in information. The project officer in an upward direction is con-
cerned with broad decision making. The project officer in a downward
direction is concerned with directing operations.
Broad decision making . The project officer seeks to have his
project approved and then to obtain the maximum financial support for
the project. His significance lies in the fact that he initiates the
budget requests. His responsibility toward pushing his assigned pro-
ject generally dwarfs any capability to allocate scarce resources
between his and other projects. Therefore, approval of a project and
assignment of an appropriate financial support must be accomplished by
higher review levels. In technical matters, broad decision making of
the allocation of scarce resources requires a comprehensive grasp of
the entire Navy Technical Organization function. This grasp must include
an understanding of the state of the art of technology, the enemy's
achievements, available resources, and the stated requirements from
the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy. Although
it is true that review levels acquire a vested interest in their own
decisions, they are quite different from the project officers, since
they do not usually originate documents concerned with directing opera-
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tions on a specific project,, Review levels are more concerned with
the achievement of a suitable balance, selection of the most promising
proposals, and effecting compatibility with established policies of the
bureau and the Navy Department,
The true mettle of the project officer during budget submission
is tested not in the original submission, but in accomodating changes
and providing resubmissions as broad policy changes are made at higher
review levels. Since the technical justification and the fiscal plan-
ning must coincide with the financial support allocated at each review
level, it is necessary to revise budget requests at each point that a
review level makes a significant change. Between a project officer and
the Chief of a Bureau lie at least six review levels. Above the Chief
of a Bureau lie eight more review levels. It is easy to see how a
controversial project can become quite confused as it passes these 15
review levels. It is difficult sometimes for the project officer to
keep abreast of just how much money he has currently been allocated.
Fortunately, each project is not changed at each level. Justifications
often are elastic and can be stretched to cover more money or contracted
to support less. In some cases, the project officer receives a bonus
prize as a higher level raises his project's financial support which
had previously been lowered at a junior review level.
Directing operations . Directing operations implementing the
decisions of the planning activity encompasses a giant complex of tasks.
The bureau through its project officers must direct its naval activities
and private contractors in the development of a storehouse of tech-
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nical know-how through basic and applied research. Adequate sup-
porting facilities must be supplied in phase with approved projects.
Tasks and contracts must be assigned for development and demonstration
of technical equipment of all types, such as ships, weapons, and air-
craft. Scheduling must be provided for quantity manufacture, trans-
portation to storage depots, storage and maintenance, and service in
fleet use. Interlaced with this scheduling must be the provision of
prompt accurate information with respect to stock levels, budget require-
ments and recommendations, status of technical projects, prospective
breakthroughs, and recommendations for changes in existing plans.
IV SUMMARY
Decisions, relationships, and activities form three important
facets of the jewel of Navy Organization. They provide convenient
windows to study the inside. A discussion of this important trium-
virate provides two important features to the reader. First, the
discussion provides the stage on which changes in Navy Organization
may be placed and with which proposed changes must be compatible.
Second, the discussion provides the reader with a reflected view of
the investigator's understanding of the Organization and thus may
provide clues as to the emergence of certain conclusions and recom-
mendations.
The backdrop is in place and the stage is set. In Chapter IV,
we start the play.

CHAPTER IV
PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE NAVY DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
In previous chapters, the objectives and resulting complex of
the Navy Department Organization have been described, with emphasis
on the technical aspects . The study of this material and the reports
of various commissions studying governmental organization have led
this investigator to favor certain changes in the Navy Department
Organization. The recommendations for these changes and the support-
ing discussion are given in this chapter.
The art of the possible . Before commencing discussion of
changes, it is appropriate to comment on the feasibility of their intro-
duction. George Cozzens so aptly described this as the "art of the
possible." Some of the proposed changes are quite revolutionary.
History advises us that such major changes have usually been intro-
2duced successfully only during periods of war-tension. By an ordin-
ary test such as measurement of the magnitude of a change, interview
and reaction of senior Navy Executives, or examination of the new
problems to be faced, such changes appear impossible. The awesome
task of rewriting thousands of position descriptions is enough to
James Gould Cozzens, Guard of Honor (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Company, 19^8), p. 395
•
2
Charles Oscar Paullin, Naval Administration 1773-1911
(Collection of articles which appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings , Annapolis, Md. s during period September 1905 to July 191^.
This is a book in the Navy Department Library, Washington, D, C„),
"Navy of the American Revolution," p. 649.
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discourage even a brave optimist Overcoming popular distrust of the
military as well as combatting the necessitites of practical politics
pose difficult barriers. * In spite of all these difficulties, this
investigator believes that a visionary Secretary of the Navy could
install this "new-look" organization.
I THE NAVY DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION AS A WHOLE
Strengthening the unityof the Department
. The problems of the
Navy Technical Organization are inseparably intertwined with the prob-
lems of the Navy Department Organization. The triumvirate of person-
nel, operations, and material must each have appropriate status, since
each without the others cannot execute its own responsibility.
Ferdinand Eberstadt, a recognized student of naval organization, com-
mented in 19^5 on the lack of a feeling of responsibility among naval
4
employees for the entire navy. The autonomous cluster of Navy tech-
nical bureaus and the lack of a clear understanding of the authority of
the Chief of Naval Operations over the Chiefs of the technical bureaus
have been recurring points of discussion in studies of Navy Organiza-
tion.
^Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power
1776-1918 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19^6), p. 570.
Ferdinand Eberstadt et al , "Unification of the War and Navy
Departments and Postwar Organization for National Security," Senate
Committee Print, 79th Congress, 1st Session of October 22, 19^5
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 19^5 )» PP» 219-220.
5Ibido, pp. 210-212, 216
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As another facet of this same unity problem, the military offi-
cers must come to the realization that they must consider the civilian
impact of their budget requests as well as the military impact. These
two impacts are related like the heads and tails of a coin. The
Hoover Commission of 1955> in reporting on the business organization of
the Department of Defense, states "because national survival is at
stake, cost cannot be the primary factor ,"7 If this had read "cost
cannot be the only primary factor," then this investigator would con-
cur c However, the present emphasis has a connotation that the military
man need really only concern-- himself with what he wants, and not how
much it costs o Such a connotation is misleading,, In the democratic
capitalistic system, price has a primary relevance. Many officers
realize this as evidenced by the growing pleas for reduction of weapon
cost. But there are still some who fail to realize the necessity of
considering all aspects of requests, including the impact upon unbal-
ancing the budget and of being able to explain the military needs in
terms of costs, Eberstadt wrote in 19^5 as follows:
Some means must be sought out to assist Congress, civilian
executives and naval officers to develop together long-range
policies and programs that will enable Congress with confidence
"Report of the Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense
Organization," United States Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Serv-
ices, 8^d Congress, 1st Session, April 11, 1955 (Washington, Government
Printing Office, 1955)? P» 5 ( Rockefeller Report ),
'Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Gov-
ernment, "Business Organization of the Department of Defense," A
Report to Congress June 1955 (Washington: G„P o 0o, 1955)» P° ^°
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to grant appropriations for the general conduct of the Navy
instead of a multiplicity of funds for specific items. This
can only be done if Congress has the assurance that money is
not being carelessly or unwisely spent, and this assurance
depends upon a greater and more continuous knowledge of the
Navy's operations and requirements than has hitherto gener-
ally existed. For this purpose some mechanism must be dev-
eloped which is not in existence °
Until all our senior officers and political executives can view and
can express themselves in an informed, unified fashion on all facets
of the allocation of scarce resources, Congress will keep a major
reservation as to the Navy's ability to spend funds without close
scrutiny o Correspondence courses such as "The Emergency Management
of the National Economy" at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces
are providing military officers with background on economic aspects of
warfare.
General Manager <, This investigator concludes that the key to
strengthening the unity of the Navy is to establish the Under Secre-
tary of the Navy as the general manager of the entire Navy Department
directly under the Secretary of the Navy. In this position, he should
preferably control the Navy Department in the manner described by the
Task Force on Department Management of the 19^9 Hoover Commission:
, ..The Under Secretary should be regarded as the alter
ego of the Secretary, responsible both for major policy
decisions and for administrative direction of the depart-
ment.
The external demands upon a Secretary are such that he
needs a strong person to give continuing attention to
Eberstadt, o£ u cit » , p. 221
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internal problems „ At the same time the Under Secretary
must be so nearly an extension of the Secretary's own
personality that the two are regarded practically as one.
The relations between the Under Secretary and the Secre-
tary must be based first of all upon complete mutual con-
fidence o The Secretary can then rely upon the Under
Secretary to carry much of his political and administra-
tive bur den o . „ <> „ » . . . . . . „ . . . . . . . . . . .9
The provision of such a general manager would serve to encourage
overall cohesion in the Navy Department, rather than the existing
fragmenting of the current bilinear organization . In the present organi-
zation, the senior military personnel are concentrated in the Office
of Naval Operations. On the other hand, the senior political leaders
are bound together in a functional sectional ization under the Under
Secretary and above the semi-autonomous bureaus,, It falls on the
shoulders of the over-burdened Secretary of the Navy to coordinate the
senior military advisors on one hand, and the political advisors on
the other o As the general manager, the Under Secretary of the Navy
could develop a unity of responsibility among all naval employees,
both military and civilian, for the entire navy. He could promote a
spirit of teamwork between the senior naval personnel and the civilian
political executives to provide the key for unlocking the door to free-
ing of appropriation limits on Navy funds But even more importantly
he could unite the energy of all naval personnel toward a conscious
development of the best overall Navy In the area of military command,
°Task Force Report on Departmental Management, "Departmental Man-
agement in Federal Administration/' Appendix E, prepared for the Commis-
sion on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, January
19^9 (Washington: G o P<,0 o , 19^9)* Po 11.
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the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps
should retain the right of direct access to the Secretary of the Navy.
The Franke Report points out the significant advantages of a balanced
use of civilian executives as follows:
To the extent that non-military matters of technology,
business, industry, and manpower can be confided to the
authoritative direction of knowledgeable and experienced
civilian executives, better decisions in these areas will
be forthcoming,, Furthermore, the military command will
receive improved support in its direction of the combatant
forces to which it can then devote its undivided attention
and energy.
. . ° . » . . . « . . . . . . . . © O
Recommendation No . 1_. The Under Secretary of the Navy should be
assigned over-all responsibility, as the general manager of the Navy
Department, for supervising and coordinating the work of the Chief of
Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the other
Civilian Executive Assistants.
Personnel . One theme that shines brightly through all of the
readings and all of the discussions is the dependence of the navy upon
capable people. * The record warns again and again that the man must
never be forgotten. World War II demonstrated the value of the men of
the Naval Reserve in supporting an expanding naval force. Therefore,
the existing allocation of one Assistant Secretary to the task of
"Personnel and Naval Reserve" appears valid. In executing this staff
William B. Franke, et. al . Report of the Committee on Organi -
zation of the Department of the Navy 1939 (Franke Report) (Washington:
Navy Department, 1959)? P» 17c
Rockefeller Report , op . cit . , p. 17; Eberstadt, op_. cit.,p. 2,
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responsibility, he should be assigned the over-all responsibility for
supervising and coordinating all of those offices and bureaus predomi-
nately engaged in personnel functions. These include the Bureaus of
Naval Personnel and Medicine and Surgery; and the Offices of Industrial
Relations and Judge Advocate General.
It should be noted that this conclusion does not coincide with
that of the Franke Report. The Franke Committee, in studying the read-
justment of Assistant Secretarial duties after the forced reduction
from four to three, concluded that the Assistant Secretary for Person-
nel and Naval Reserve was the one of the four which could, however
reluctantly, be dispensed with. 12 The Franke Report does not clarify
the reasoning for this selection, but one plausible explanation might
be that the other three areas — Material, Financial Management, and
Research and Development — are those which seem to have the more press-
ing immediate problems and no one is willing to redelegate any of these
functions to a single Assistant Secretary by consolidation, or to drop
the Financial Management to a supporting staff role. This investiga-
tor selects the Assistant Secretary for Personnel and Naval Reserve
for continuation because of a belief that in the long run, the devel-
opment and motivation of a high-quality personnel force is one which
requires constant political attention by an Assistant Secretary. If
the personnel policies are properly selected and implemented, the basic
resources of the Navy, its trained people, are being properly nurtured.
12Franke, op_„ cit
„ , p. 57<
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The development of an Admiral or a Senior Civil Servant may take 50
years. Such development should not be left to chance.
This investigator concurs with the dual responsibility assigned
to the Chief of Naval Personnel as the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Personnel and Naval Reserve .5 For similar reasons, it appears
equally valid to assign dual responsibility to the Chief of Industrial
Relations to be the Deputy Chief of Personnel of a proposed Service of
Naval Material.
Recommendati on No . 2.
a. The assignment of. an Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Personnel and Reserve Forces should be continued. This Assistant Sec-
retary should be assigned the over-all responsibility for supervising
and coordinating the Bureaus of Naval Personnel and Medicine and Sur-
gery, and the Offices of Industrial Relations and Judge Advocate
General
.
b. The assignment of a dual responsibility to the Chief of
Naval Personnel as the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Personnel
and Naval Reserve should be continued.
c. The Chief of Industrial Relations should be assigned dual
responsibility as the Deputy Chief of Personnel in a proposed Service
of Naval Material.
Operations . The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1958 has placed the exercise of military command as the responsibility
15
Report of the Committee on Organization of the Department of
the Navy , 16 April 195^ (Gates Report) (Washington: G.P.O. , 195^ )»PP. 50-1.
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of the Secretary of Defense, assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to
be exercised through the commanders of unified combatant commands and
specified combatant commands ^ The Navy Department has been assigned
the responsibility for administration of the naval forces assigned to
such commands and for providing full support of personnel and material,,
The result is that the Navy Department now has an important support-
ing role; whereas it participates in command primarily through member-
ship of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations in
various Secretary of Defense control groups.
Still, one of the Navy's primary objectives continues to be the
provision of Operating Forces for prosecution of war. Navy flag offi-
cers concerned with command functions will continue to play strong roles
in the direction of the Navy Department. Still, there appears to be a
weakness in the area of bringing the primary needs of the Operating
Forces to the political leaders of the Navy Department and higher
echelons. In order to strengthen the political support for the needs
of the Operating Forces, it is recommended that a new Assistant Secre-
tary of the Navy be designated for Operations. This investigator's
concept would be of the Assistant Secretary, the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps forming a triumvirate to
execute this readiness function with all three reporting directly to
1
"Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958," Public Law
85-599, 85th Congress, H.R. 12^41, August 6, 1958j "Functions of the
Department of Defense and its Major Components," Department of Defense




the Under Secretary of the Navy. Strengthening in this area also
becomes important as the Chief of Naval Operations finds that his res-
ponsibilities as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff take more and
more time. The Assistant Secretary should be concerned with reviewing
military strategy, broad weapon concepts, enemy intelligence, and
logistics support. He should also be concerned with personal inspec-
tion of fleet readiness and obtaining a full understanding of the prob-
lems of the Operating Forces. ' Further, he should be concerned with
political aspects of working with NATO and other foreign naval alli-
ances.
Recommendation No . j£. A new Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Opera-
tions should be designated. This Secretary should report to the Under
Secretary of the Navy and should be charged with collaborating with the
Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps on
provision of Operating Forces for prosecution of war.
Material . The Navy Department centralizes military operations,
personnel matters, and civilian control. Yet, in the area of material
support, the technical bureaus report in a complex uncentralized maze
on various technical areas to the Chief of Naval Operations, Chief of
Naval Research, Chief of Naval Material, and the several Civilian
Executive Assistants of the Navy. The autonomous nature of the bureaus
has an advantage in developing capable naval leaders. Previous war
experience pays tribute to the ability of the bureaus to perform
1<5
^Rockefeller Report , op . cit ., p. 12,

tremendous feats of supply,,
However, throughout the history of the Navy Technical Organiza-
tion one disquieting theme — the lack of adequate central coordina-
tion — keeps recurring. In describing the problems of the bureaus of
the last half of the nineteenth century, Charles Paullin, a noted naval
historian, commented:
The most reliable and definite criticism of the bureau
system was made by the Secretaries of the Navy and the
naval committees, ...It was maintained that the division
of responsibility or executive power in the Navy Depart-
ment, and likewise in the navy yards, was excessive.
There were too many bureaus. Each of them was more or
less independent of the other. Each magnified its own
work, was jealous of its own powers, and was impatient
of restraint. The bureaus were like so many little navy
departments occupying towards the Secretary of the Navy
the same relation that the several departments of the
government occupy towards the President. ...The depart-
ment lacking the proper correlating, coordinating, or
unifying organs. The only instrumentality of this sort
was the Secretary of the Navy. . „
.
The evils of the excessive division of responsibility
were said to be especially manifest in the building, equip-
ping and arming of ships. ...Since a modern ship was a unit
and did not fall into four well-defined and mutually exclu-
sive parts, the duties of these bureaus often overlapped;
they interfered and conflicted with each other. ...Each
bureau attended carefully to its own work, but no one
attended to combining their several activities into an
organized, homogeneous and effective whole. Each bureau
might perform its work perfectly from its own standpoint,
while in the end the finished product might be a decided
I R1 X UrCo ooo o o O O O O O O O O O O O o o © o o o o • '
Elting E. Morison, Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 19^2), p.72j Robert H. Connery,
The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization in World War II (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 592.
Paullin, op_. cit., p. 1259-1260 (see part 5)
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This description has relevance today
Morison in describing the technical bureaus during the World
War I period of the 20th Century states "the failure of the system lay
in the fact that
. .. it failed to make provision for that concentra-
tion which is necessary to fight. "1° Harold and Margaret Sprout, in
commenting on the experience of World War I, decry the forces that
"had perpetuated an unwieldy departmental organization, notoriously
weak when it came to planning the work of the Navy as a whole, and to
coordinating the functions of its many branches." °
Fleet Admiral King characterized the lack of central military
control over the technical bureaus as "a fundamental weakness in the
organization of the Navy Department" Eberstadt in describing the
experience of World War II continues the assault:
oooA system of administration by mutual consent. In the
best of times, all the separate agencies of the Department,
the secretarial agencies, the Chief of Naval Operations, and
the bureaus, perform together within a framework provided by
tradition and habit. The essence of such an administration
is mutual debate and voluntary agreement. .„ .But in the
worst of times the spirit of cooperation breaks down and the
separate agencies, reinforced in many cases by their own
money and in every instance by their own specialized sources
of information, tend to travel more independent courses. At
such times unity is abandoned and the realities of the situa-
tion are revealed.
oooooooooooooooooooooo
l^Morison, op_. cit., p. 72
19sprout, op_o cit . , p„ 570.
20Ernest J. King and Walter M. Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King
A Naval Record (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1952), p. 475 footnote,
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It is, in fact, difficult to level criticism at the
bureaus individually in the execution of their technical
responsibilities, but it is equally difficult to defend
their performance collectively in the pursuit of the end
of military efficiency. .......... 21
In the post war era, the 1955 Hoover Commission commented on
the bureau system as follows:
The traditional organization for Research and Develop-
ment of the Army and Navy are not well suited to the needs
of modern weaponry development. A weapons system is fre-
quently made up of elements developed by two or more Corps
or Bureaus. This compartmentalization of weaponry develop-
ment between a number of independent Technical Corps (in the
Army) and Technical Bureaus (in the Navy) makes effective-
ness and efficiency in the operations of today most
difficult oooooo.. ooooooooooocoeoooo
Kintner also criticizes hampering of coordinating policies for new
weapons by "vested interests" within the services, citing the struggle
between the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics and Bureau of Ordnance for
control of missiles development. '
This investigator concludes that strong centralization of control
24
of the material functions must be established. There seem to be two
compelling reasons for continuing to press for strong centralization.
First, the growing size of wars is causing an increasing impact of the
21
Eberstadt, o_p_. cit., p. 216.
22
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
"Research and Development in the Government," A Report to Congress May
1955 (Washington: G.P.O., 1955), P» 17-18.
25william R. Kintner, Forging a New Sword A Study of the Depart-
ment of Defense (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1958), P«9^.
ok^ Rockefeller Report , op. cit., p. 1
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requirements of the military upon the economy of the nation as a whole.
Shortages of material, conflicts with the demands of other services,
and needs for coordination and standardization will require increased
unified attention in future wars. Second, time of introduction of a
new weapon system must be shortened to a minimum,. The Navy Technical
Organization must have the organizational flexibility to expedite the
complete weapon system process from research to fleet-introduction by
quick realignment of personnel, facilities, and money e ^ To accomplish
this, this investigator concludes that the material functions must be
consolidated to be under the political leadership of a single Assist-
ant Secretary and under the managing leadership of a single military
leader.
This investigator does not concur with either King or Kintner
that this responsibility should be centralized under the Chief of
Naval Operations. 2" The Chief of Naval Operations and his office have
a sufficiently challenging task in defining the "what, "where," and
"when" of material without stalling on the additional overload of "how ,
The Franke Board tends somewhat toward Chief of Naval Operations cen-
tralization by proposing the establishment of a new Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations for Development. ' This investigator concurs with
the resulting centralization except for the transfer of the functions
25
Kintner, op_. cit., p. 19»
2<$King, £E» cit., p. 4j5s Kintner, op_. cit ., p. 193<
2
'Franke, op_. cit ., p. 62.
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of scientific data collection and development coordination from the
Office of Naval Research. The Deputy for Operations should be required
to depend upon the material bureaus and their department hierarchy for
information, rather than being permitted to have his own intelligence
system. The present proposed organization, unless very tactfully
underplayed by the Deputy for Operations, can cause severe resentment
within the technical bureaus as the Deputy for Operations tends to
rely on his own sources of analysis and information. Both the Deputy
for Operations and the material bureaus should be working from a
single information system. -
Nor does this investigator concur with the recommendations of
the Hoover Commission which have encouraged the continuation of the
present splinter method of functional Assistant Secretaries for Research
and for Material. The present organization of semi-autonomous bureaus
under a cooperative lead bureau system with a functional cluster of
Assistant Secretaries is not likely to lend itself to speedy intro-
duction of new weapons. The lead bureau concept lacks the unifying
force of a single leader other than the Under Secretary of the Navy
to encourage personnel of the bureaus to accept sacrifices for other
bureaus. It is paradoxical to this investigator that the Navy which
has always fought for and recognized the value of a single military
command turns its back on this unifying concept in its task of quick
development of weapon systems.
^"Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Gov-
ernment, "Research and Development on the Government," A Report to the
Congress May 1955 .
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In order to achieve the most rapid introduction of new material
and to insure a unified economical manufacture of supporting material,
the establishment of a single Service of Naval Material headed by a
Vice Admiral and supervised and coordinated by an Assistant Secretary
of the Navy suggests itself .29 in this investigator's concept, these
two individuals would have adjacent offices and act as a closely-knit
political-executive team. 3° To them would fall the responsibility of
the leading of their technical organization employees to an understand-
ing of the need for joint endeavor and of the necessity for mutual
sacrifice.
Recommendation No . 4.
a. An Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Material should be
designated. He should be assigned over-all responsibility for super-
vising and coordinating the Service of Naval Material.
b. A Service of Naval Material should be established to be
headed by a Vice Admiral, appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate for a four-year term. The Chief of Naval
Material should have the responsibility for the direction and coordi-
nating of all research, development, procurement, production, and dis-
tribution of material and facilities in support of the Operating Forces.
The Service of Naval Material should absorb the functions formerly
2
°Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Gov-
ernment, "Departmental Management," Task Force Report , January 19^9 *
p. 15-
^Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Gov-
ernment, "Personnel and Civil Service, " Task Force Report , February
1955 . P. 2-6.
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executed by the Offices of Naval Research, Naval Material, and Naval
Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserve; and the Bureaus of Aeronautics, Ships,
Ordnance, Supplies and Accounts, and Yards and Docks.
Miscellaneous
. There are several offices at the Department Level
which have not yet been considered: Office of Information, Office of
Legislative Liaison, the Comptroller, Administrative Office, Navy
Management Office, and Office of Analysis and Review.
In the investigator's concept, these offices would all report
to the Under Secretary of the Navy. They would be grouped in two
parts: an Office of Information concerned with the flow of information
necessary for control by the Secretary's Office or higher levels, and
an Office of Innovation concerned with the study of the Navy Organi-
zation with a view toward improvement and simplification. There needs
to be a place to keep alive a critical examination of the Navy Organi-
zation as a whole on a continuing basis. The first would be comprised
of the present Office of Information, the Office of Legislative Liaison,
and the Comptroller. The second would be comprised of the Administra-
tive Office, the Navy Management Office, and the Office of Analysis
and Review. These offices need not be combined but should be mutually
supporting.
A significant consequence of this relationship would be the
abolishment of the existing assignment of an Assistant Secretary for
Financial Management. Instead, the Navy Comptroller and corresponding
representatives from the three major groupings, operations, personnel,
and material, should form an operating group to review and approve
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navy-wide directives for documentation for budgets and reports. Where
the group agreed unanimously on introduction of navy-wide documenta-
tion, they should have the authority to introduce the new directives.
Where there was a lack of unanimity, the directive should be forwarded
to the Under Secretary for review and a decision. The Navy Comptroller
should, however, have independent analysis responsibilities for report-
ing to the Under Secretary of the Navy on the state of the Naval Estab-
lishment. It should be noted that this proposal differs from the Gates
Report which recommends the establishment of a separate Assistant for
Financial Management. 5* This investigator considers that this estab-
lishment of the Comptroller as a supporting function has the signifi-
cant benefit of emphasizing the real objectives of the Navy Department.
It is considered that the emphasis on primary objectives has values
which far outweigh the inconvenience to the Comptroller of having to
sell his comptroller programs to a control committee.
Recommendation No . £.
a. An Office of Information should be established which reports
to the Under Secretary of the Navy to be comprised of the present Office
of Information, the Office of Legislative Liaison, and the Comptroller.
b. An Office of Innovation should be established which reports
Report on Navy Department of \6 April 195^1 op. cit., p. 22.
52See the comment of Commissioner Holifield that the comp-
troller's function is probably being overexalted by the accountants.
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
"Budget and Accounting," A Report to the Congress June 1955 (Washington;
G.P.O. 1955), P° 7°; AcTo Mahan, Naval Administration and Warfare ,
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1908), p„ 7.
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to the Under Secretary of the Navy to be comprised of the Administra-
tive Office, the Navy Management Office, and the Office of Analysis
and Review.
c. A Comptroller's Control Group should be established to approve
all navy-wide introduction of new documents for budget and reports.
Where unanimous approval of the Group cannot be achieved, directives
should be forwarded to the Under Secretary of the Navy for review and
decision. The Control Group should be comprised of the Navy Comptrol-
ler, and one representative from each of the three major areas of
operations, personnel, and material.
II THE NAVY TECHNICAL ORGANIZATION
In Part I, the recommendation for a Service of Naval Material
was made. This Service was to be comprised of the present Offices of
Naval Research, Naval Material, and Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale
Reserve; and the Bureaus of Aeronautics, Ships, Ordnance, Supplies and
Accounts, and Yards and Docks. This Part makes recommendations con-
cerning the organization of such a Service of Naval Material.
Vertical division . This investigator considers that movement
out of the Washington, D, C. area for as much of the Service Office as
possible is a distinct necessity. Ultimately, the long-suffering,
World War I temporary Navy Building on Constitution Avenue will be dis-
mantled and the navy bureaus will have to be relocated. Secondly, the
Washington, D„ C. governmental complex affords a primary enemy target
from which dispersal of offices is a distinct advantage. Not only is
the area a target for ICBM's, but it is also a target for guided
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missile submarines operating in the nearby Atlantic Ocean.
It appears practicable to divide the Service on the basis of
broad decision making to be accomplished in a central office in Wash-
ington, D. C. and directing operations to be accomplished at various
bureaus at other locations.
The Service Office, at Washington, D, C , is conceived to be
comprised of the following divisions:
Personnel ~ concerned with assignment and training of per-
sonnel within the Naval Material Service (the
head of this division should also be the Chief
of Industrial Relations).
Plans — concerned with existing budgets and those being
processed through Congress, Implements Opera-
tional Requirements and Development Character-
istics, Reviews progress status on all projects
and programs. Provides active coordination for
all funded programs. Coordinates station over-
all programs and processes requests for facili-
ties. Receives guidelines from the Innovation
Division after approval by the Chief of the
Service of Naval Material,
Innovation — concerned with long range planning beyond cur-
rent budget period, both technical and facili-
ties. Concerned with new ideas, radical con-
cepts, and basic research. Blocks out advance

55
planning for plans division. Performs
inspection function of bureaus and stations
for the Chief and to provide grist for the
long range plans mill.
Comptroller — handles the fiscal actions of the Service.
Provides computing and compiling service.
Establishes uniform documentation to meet bud-
getary and project review requirements. Member
of Department Comptroller Control Group,
Expediting — processes contract clearances, claimant offices
for scarce materials, transportation and other
bottlenecks. Provides liaison office for all
bureaus and stations.
Administrative ~ provides supporting services such as housekeeping
and mail room.
The Office of Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserve would be included
in the Plans Division. Additional provisions may be necessary for direc-
tion of the Bureaus of Supplies and Accounts and Yards and Docks.
Outside of the Washington, D. C. area, the directing of opera-
tions would be accomplished by the following bureaus:
Supplies and Accounts — perform existing functions.
Yards and Docks — perform existing functions.
Research ~ perform existing functions.
Ships — to provide the floating bases including the hulls,
ship propulsion, habitability, storage spaces, fuel
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handling, ship handling, galleys, and other living
conveniences. (This is similar to the existing
Bureau of Ships, except that all technical responsi-
bilities for material utilized in fleet command or
weapons control would be transferred to the new
Bureau of Weapons.
)
Weapons — to provide all of the elements of the weapons system
needed for control in battle and for delivery of the
destructive force to the enemy. This would include
the functions of the existing Bureau of Ordnance and
Bureau of Aeronautics, plus the radar, sonar, radio,
and combat information center responsibilities of
the existing Bureau of Ships.
The Bureaus of Supplies and Accounts and Yards and Docks per-
form functions which are essential for support of the Navy Department
and this investogator does not detect any gain to be achieved by con-
solidation with other functions.
The Bureau of Research (Office of Naval Research) serves a valu-
able investment function in broadening the technical state of the art
through its support of basic research. This investigator has not
reached any conclusion nor seen any evidence which encourages merger
of its basic research function with the Bureaus of Ships and Weapons.
However, any control functions which the Office of Naval Research for-
merly performed of the research of the bureaus should be accomplished
by the Service Office.
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The last two bureaus — Ships and Weapons — are most vitally
concerned with the marketing operation of the Navy in delivery by the
Operating Forces of destructive force to the enemy. As one compares
the Navy with its sister services, the Air Force and the Army, one
notes that the distinguishing feature of the Navy is the floating base .
The ships ~ aircraft carriers, cruisers, tankers, submarines «— serve
as mobile camps which house, feed, and amuse the military personnel
while a search is being made for the enemy. Comfort of personnel
becomes a significant factor, since cruises are of indefinite dura-
tion. The floating base also provides a means for moving the delivery
system within range of the enemy and of providing a store of hard goods
for his destruction.
This floating base offers a scheduling problem to the Navy
planner since one base normally outlives several families of delivery
systems. New radars are added, modern aircraft replace the old, and
storage systems for odd-shaped guided missiles must be provided.
Frequently such modernizing alterations can take place only during
major overhauls in naval shipyards. The scheduler must keep the float-
ing bases ready to accept the modern weapons, a most difficult task.
With the introduction of guided missiles, long-range bombers,
low-flying snoopers, and atomic bombs, the fleet weapon system planner
must consider all aspects of his delivery system. He is concerned
with the early warning radar, whether on board ship or mounted in an
orbiting aircraft. He needs full knowledge of the radio communication
network which links the battle force. The sonar secrets which enable

56
penetration of the water fog must be understood by him. He is con-
cerned with the product being delivered to the consumer — the atomic
warhead or high explosive warhead. He needs to understand the trans-
porting agents or delivery trucks such as guided missiles, torpedoes,
projectiles, and bomber aircraft. He must know the method of control
aboard the floating base — the computer, the combat information cen-
ter, air control, the directors, and various plots. In actual combat
with an enemy, all of these aspects are closely interrelated.
Hence, this investigator concludes that the Bureau of Ships
should be concerned with providing the living floating base and the
Bureau of Weapons should be concerned with providing all elements of
the weapons system needed for control in battle, for detection of the
enemy, and for delivery of the destructive force to the enemy. This
investigator was unable to find any value in consolidating the two
bureaus into a single bureau.
Recommendation No . 6.
a. A central office for the Service of Naval Material should
be established in Washington, D. C. to perform the function of broad
decision making with respect to the allocation of scarce resources.
b. The existing bureaus of Supplies and Accounts and Yards and
Dooks, and the Office of Naval Research should be continued essentially
as is. However, these activities should be relocated away from the
Washington, D. C. area.
Co A Bureau of Ships should be established which absorbs those
functions of the existing Bureau of Ships concerned with providing a
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habitable floating base. This bureau should be relocated away from
the Washington, D. C. area.
d. A Bureau of Weapons should be established which absorbs
the functions of the existing Bureaus of Ordnance and Aeronautics and
those functions of the Bureau of Ships having to do with the control of
delivery systems in combat, for detection of the enemy, and for deliv-
ery of destructive forces to the enemy. This bureau should be relo-
cated away from the Washington, D. C. area,
III MISCELLANEOUS
This Part discusses recommendations on innovation.
Innovation
.
Previous recommendations have suggested that
offices of innovation be established reporting to the Under Secretary
of the Navy and the Chief of the Service of Naval Material. There are
two additional concepts concerning innovation which are important:
freeing of upward channels, and freeing of downward channels."
The environment for handling ideas within the Department of the
Navy should be altered so that two classes of ideas are recognized.
One class would continue as at present to be the formal recommendation
of a ship or station commander which stems out of his assigned res-
ponsibility to keep his superiors advised of desired improvements or
unsatisfactory conditions. These should go forward to the Navy Tech-
nical Bureau via the squadron commander, the type -commander, the fleet
commander, and the Chief of Naval Operations. Formal answers should be
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required o However, a second class of informal ideas should also be
recognized o These should be the brainstorming type of idea which
should be fed directly to Offices of Innovation in the Navy Department
for consideration, but with no necessity for a formal reply, nor the
necessity for obtaining endorsements from all concerned parties. This
investigator knows of a recommendation forwarded by a junior officer
concerned with establishment of a distinguishing breast insignia to
designate qualified technical officers in the Department of Defense.
This idea slid through a discouraging morass of endorsements in various
technical bureaus, and was finally rejected by an Assistant Secretary
of the Navy The bureaus had no other choice, since they were required
to submit a considered endorsement, but to comment that they in essence
were not convinced of the value. This investigator considers that the
better method of handling the idea would have been to send it directly
to an office of innovation who could consider its merits, along with
other ideas to see what synthesis might be made from a multitude of
ideas o No formal reply to the originator should be required unless
his idea ring3 the bell of being useable c
For downward channels, the Service of Naval Material should issue
a periodic magazine, on the order of "All Hands," concerned with the
problems of material. This magazine would be a unifying force for the
whole Service, Portions of the magazine would be allocated to the
bureaus for discussion of individual problems. But more importantly,
the Office of Innovation would feed into the magazine unclassified ideas
and problems for stimulation of the readers, A regular feature of the
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magazine would be a value engineering page Guest articles might be
invited from industry to discuss perplexing problems of industrial-
naval relations which need to be improved,. An educational section on
governmental processes above the Secretarial level would be most
valuable. Finally, reports of material introduced into the Operating
Forces should be included to show where results were good and where
failure occurred,. Emphasis should be placed on informality of style
and stimulation of thought, rather than precise official jargonese.
Recommendation No , 2« Present methods of handling ideas should be
revised to permit unofficial ideas to be presented to Offices of Inno-
vation in the Navy Department, and to provide a counterflow of stimu-
lating ideas from the Navy Department to personnel throughout the
Service of Naval Material.

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I CONCLUSIONS
In summary, the major conclusions made by the investigator
throughout this report are:
Objectives of the Navy Department ,, The objectives of the Navy
Department must be established to meet the requirements of three
groupings of people: (1) the enemy as the consumer, (2) the American
people as a whole setting the working framework, and (5) the individual
as an articulate source of power and labor. To meet these require-
ments, the Navy Department has to achieve three corresponding objec-
tives: provision of forces for war, conformance with national customs,
mores, and laws, and meeting needs of the individual employee.
Subsidiary Objectives of the Navy Technical Organization . In
addition to supporting the objectives of the Navy Department Organiza-
tion, the Navy Technical Organization is concerned with achieving the
following subsidiary objectives: providing maximum readiness, achiev-
ing orderly innovations, and producing maximum cost efficiency.
Division of bureau-level activities . When considering broad
aspects of the decision-making process at the bureau level, this inves-
tigator concludes that the activities can be divided into two major
groups: broad decision making and directing operations.
The " floating base " concept . The unique feature of the Navy as
distinguished from the Army or Air Force is the floating base which
must serve the dual function of providing long-term housing and
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transport for military personnel prior to engaging in battle, and then
of providing the base for command and for supply of weapons during the
actual battle.
Relationships , Impinging upon the decision-making process in
the Navy Department are important relationships such as political,
economic, and individual. The Organization must be able to accomodate
these relationships.
Centralization of control of the Navy material functions .
Because of the increasing impact of the requirements of the military •
departments on the civilian^ economy and because of the need to shorten
to a minimum the research-to-fleet introduction time of new weapons, it
is concluded that strong centralization of control of the Navy material
functions should be effected.
II RECOMMENDATIONS
In summary, the specific recommendations made by the investigator
throughout this report are:
1. General Manager . The Under Secretary of the Navy should be
assigned over-all responsibility, as the general manager of the Navy
Department, for supervising and coordinating the work of the Chief of
Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the other
Civilian Executive Assistants.
2. Personnel .
a. The assignment of an Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Personnel and Reserve Forces should be continued. This Assistant
Secretary should be assigned the over-all responsibility for supervis-
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vising and coordinating the Bureaus of Naval Personnel and Medicine
and Surgery, and the Offices of Industrial Relations and Judge Advo-
cate General.
b. The assignment of a dual responsibility to the Chief of
Naval Personnel as the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Personnel
and Naval Reserve should be continued.
c. The Chief of Industrial Relations should be assigned
dual responsibility as the Deputy Chief of Personnel in a proposed
Service of Naval Material.
5. Operations . A new Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Operations should be designated. This Secretary should report to the
Under Secretary of the Navy and should be charged with collaborating
with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps on provision of Operating Forces for prosecution of war.
4. Material
.
a. An Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Material should
be designated. He should be assigned over-all responsibility for super-
vising and coordinating the Service of Naval Material.
b. A Service of Naval Material should be established to be
headed by a Vice Admiral, appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, for a four-year term. The Chief of Naval
Material should have the responsibility for the direction and coordinat-
ing of all research, development, procurement, production, and distri-
bution of material and facilities in support of the Operating Forces.
The Service of Naval Material should absorb the functions formerly
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executed by the Offices of Naval Research, Naval Material, and Naval
Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserve; and the Bureaus of Aeronautics, Ships,
Ordnance, Supplies and Accounts, and Yards and Docks.
5. Miscellaneous.,
a An Office of Information should be established which
reports to the Under Secretary of the Navy, to be comprised of the
present Office of Information, the Office of Legislative Liaison, and
the Comptroller.
bo An Office of Innovation should be established which
reports to the Under Secretary of the Navy to be comprised of the Admini-
strative Office, the Navy Management Office, and the Office of Analysis
and Review,
Co A Comptroller's Control Group should be established to
approve all navy-wide introduction of new documents for budget and
reports. Where unanimous approval of the Group cannot be achieved,
directives should be forwarded to the Under Secretary of the Navy for
review and decision,, The Control Group should be comprised of the Navy
Comptroller and one representative from each of the three major areas
of operations, personnel, and material
»
6, Vertical division of the Navy Technical Organization .
a„ A central office for the Service of Naval Material should
be established in Washington, D C. to perform the function of broad
decision making with respect to the allocation of scarce resources,
bo The existing bureaus of Supplies and Accounts and Yards
and Docks and the Office of Naval Research should be continued essen-
tially as is. However, these activities should be relocated away from
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the Washington, D. C area.
c. A Bureau of Ships should be established which absorbs
those functions of the existing Bureau of Ships concerned with pro-
viding a habitable floating base. This bureau should be relocated
away from the Washington, D. C area.
do A Bureau of Weapons should be established which absorbs
the functions of the existing Bureaus of Ordnance and Aeronautics and
those functions of the Bureau of Ships having to do with the control
of delivery systems in combat, for detection of the enemy, and for
delivery of destructive forces to the enemy. This bureau should be
relocated away from the Washington, D. C. area.
7. Innovation . Present methods of handling ideas should be
revised to permit unofficial ideas to be presented to Offices of Inno-
vation in the Navy Department, and to provide a counterflow of stimu-
lating ideas from the Navy Department to personnel throughout the
Service of Naval Material.
Ill SUMMARY CHARTS
Figures 4 and 5 ln Summary show a before and after view of the
Navy Department Organization based on the conclusions and recommenda-
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.The Chief of Naval Operations has coordinating and directive
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may be necessary to meet operating requirements.
.This is the Navy Department Organization prior to an implementa-
tion of the 1959 Franke Report.
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GUIDE FOR INTERVIEWS IN CONNECTION WITH A MASTER'S THESIS ON
"An Analysis of the Navy Technical Organization at the Bureau Level"
In general, I am searching for comments on the capability of the
existing technical organization to meet now and in wartime in an opti-
mum manner the needs of the operating fleet. The following are speci-
fic areas of interest:
lo Each year, a Bureau Chief goes to his superiors and Congress
and supports an overall budget for his Bureau which proposes an overall
technical program based on the best available information. Prior to
the next budget review, such a program or aspects of it may come under
critical review , At what point does a criticism become significant
enough to warrant changing the established program? What forces
operate on a Bureau Chief -tending to prevent such mid-year changes?
2. In the operating fleet, ships are assigned for administra-
tive purposes to Type Commanders and for combat operations to Task
Force Commanders,, Doesn't it seem desirable that in a similar manner
personnel within the Technical Bureaus should be combined for joint
projects under a Project Officer in a manner similar to POLARIS? Per-
haps the answer here is to establish a single Technical Bureau to pro-
vide a single common administrator and an adjustable project staff?
5» One of the most difficult problems in any organization is
the encouragement of positive criticism from junior personnel. In a
military organization, layers of endorsements on letters forwarded via
chains of command seem to stifle all but the most stubborn Sims-like
person. Recognizing a slight weakening of command chains and a possible
impact on fitness reports, nevertheless, wouldn't there be significant
advantage in permitting direct letters of comment by naval personnel
to technical bureaus on technical matters?
A. In considering the Navy Technical Organization for the next
decade, what do you consider are the most pressing problems which will
exist and how do you feel they should be solved?
Note: All interviews are off the record and no quotes of individual
persons are made unless prior approval is obtained.







